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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 20-2843
_____________
WILLIAM MARROQUIN-CORDOVA,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
_______________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
United States Department of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA 1:A209-418-182)
Immigration Judge: Matthew H. Watters
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
April 13, 2021
Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Filed: June 22, 2021)
_______________
OPINION ∗
_______________

This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
does not constitute binding precedent.
∗

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
William Marroquin-Cordova (“Marroquin”) argues that his uncles will persecute
and torture him because he is a member of a particular social group (“PSG”) comprised
of descendants of his grandfather and because of his political affiliation with the Patriot
Party. We agree with the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) that Marroquin failed to demonstrate a nexus to a statutorily protected ground. It
appears that his uncles targeted him out of greed and other economic resentment, not out
of an animus toward the alleged PSG, nor because of his political opinion. For that
reason, the IJ and BIA denied his claim for withholding of removal. The IJ and BIA also
appropriately held that Marroquin’s claim for relief under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”) lacks merit because he did not show that the authorities would
acquiesce in torture. We will therefore deny the petition for review.
I.

BACKGROUND 1
Marroquin grew up with his parents and four siblings in Santa Cruz El Chol, Baja

Verapaz, Guatemala. He is a member of the Patriot Party and, in 2014, began working on
the second election campaign of Mayor Hector Adolfo Mayen-Alvarado (“Mayor
Mayen”), who won elections in 2012 and 2016. Marroquin also worked for the local
government in 2014 and 2015 as the Assistant of Public Services and the Promoter of
Sports and Recreation, which were desirable government positions.

The following is drawn primarily from Marroquin’s removal hearing testimony
and is consistent with the IJ’s findings of fact.
1
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He describes his uncles Raul and Pedro Cordova threatening to kill him “a lot of
times” between 2014 and 2016, which eventually drove him out of Guatemala. (AR at
131.) He explained that his uncles were jealous of his government positions, given that
they had lost their positions as bodyguards for the previous mayor of 16 years, who was a
member of the competing Leader Party. 2 Additionally, they were envious of Marroquin’s
potential claim to land previously owned by his grandfather, who died in 2019. That land
was supposedly devised to Marroquin’s father, his uncle Raul, and another uncle,
Nicholas, who has since died. Although Marroquin expressed some uncertainty as to the
devisees, which may have included his uncle Pedro, he was confident that his father
inherited a portion of the property, and that he, Marroquin, might then inherit his father’s
portion. His uncles Pedro and Raul did not “want to give anyone any share of” his
grandfather’s property, desiring it for themselves. (AR at 134.) Marroquin believed that
to be the reason why his cousin, the son of his uncle Nicholas, was murdered after
Nicholas’s death. Marroquin testified that his cousin had told him shortly before his
death that Raul and Pedro were making threats. Marroquin says that his father has not
been killed, despite continuing to live in Guatemala, for a few reasons: because he may
not have taken the land, because Raul and Pedro would not want to kill their brother, and
because they see his father as a “good person.” 3 (AR at 139.)

He noted that, though he had previously had “small problems” with his uncles,
those problems worsened after Mayor Mayen was elected and Marroquin started working
for him. (AR at 148.)
2

Marroquin’s father submitted a statement, attached to Marroquin’s application,
but made no mention of inherited property, only claiming that he purchased land in 2008
3
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After two years of threatening to kill him, Marroquin’s uncles showed up at a
soccer match where Marroquin was working, armed with guns. He escaped by
motorcycle, claiming that townspeople attending the game stopped his uncles from
getting to him. He did not return home because his uncles would occasionally (and
continued thereafter to) fire guns at his house. He remained in Guatemala, but not in his
home, for roughly another month. Marroquin did not file a report with the police and
said that no one else had done so because his uncles have influence over the police and
retained power from their former government jobs. He also did not ask the Mayor for
help with the threats against him, thinking the Mayor “wouldn’t be able to give [him] that
help.” (AR at 143-44.) He did, however, inform the Mayor’s office that he was leaving
his job due to the threats by his uncles. Even after arriving in the United States, he has
continued to receive threats over Facebook and WhatsApp. He believes the threats are
from his uncles acting under different identities.
Marroquin was ordered removed after his arrival in the United States, in
September 2016, and he was in fact promptly removed. He illegally reentered the
country in December 2016. In November 2019, the Department of Homeland Security

and sold that land in 2012. He mentioned economic extortion by gangs, but not from
Marroquin’s uncles. He did say that some family members were jealous of his land,
including “Raul and Pedro Cordova, … who were upset that I owned this land and they
took out their anger on my son, William [Marroquin-Cordova].” (AR at 232.)
Marroquin had not spoken to his father before or after the statement but theorized that his
father’s focus on gangs was out of fear that Raul and Pedro would kill him if he made a
declaration against them. Marroquin also testified that his father later sent his two
younger brothers to live in the United States because he “was afraid that when they
reached adulthood they would be receiving the same threats that I was receiving.” (AR at
162.)
4

issued a Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Removal Order and shortly
thereafter Marroquin completed a reasonable fear interview. His case was referred to an
IJ based on that interview. He applied for withholding of removal and relief under the
CAT, and a hearing was held in February 2020.
Although the IJ noted inconsistencies between Marroquin’s testimony and his
father’s statement, he found Marroquin credible. Nevertheless, after evaluating
Marroquin’s withholding claim, the IJ concluded that “any harm that Mr. Marroquin
contends would befall if he was returned to Guatemala is based not on any protected
basis but instead based on personal conflicts or criminal acts or extortion.” (App. at 12.)
He also rejected Marroquin’s contention the PSG of “descendants of [Marroquin’s]
grandfather,” or a “political opinion” based on Marroquin’s party affiliation, was a
central basis of his alleged persecution, finding instead that jealousy of land inheritance
was the primary cause of his uncles’ threats. (App. at 11-13.) Additionally, the IJ noted
that other members of the alleged PSG, such as Marroquin’s father, suffered no
persecution, and that it is speculative whether Marroquin would even inherit the property
his uncles allegedly covet. Likewise, the IJ found Marroquin’s PSG not cognizable
because “there are multiple descendants [of his] grandfather” who are not being
threatened or persecuted, “includ[ing] … his two brothers and sister, his father and the
persecutors themselves.” (App. at 14.) Lastly, the IJ rejected Marroquin’s claim for
relief under the CAT because he “failed to illustrate that any harm that he would face
would be at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.”
(App. at 16.)
5

The BIA affirmed the denial of Marroquin’s withholding of removal claim, stating
that “[t]he familial relationship has not been shown to be the motivating force for the
threats, given that only some potential inheritors of the land were targets of threats[,]”
and noting that Marroquin’s father was not afraid of his brothers. (App. at 5.) It rejected
Marroquin’s request to provide corroborating evidence, because even if Marroquin were
given an opportunity to corroborate his claim that his uncles murdered his cousin, that
evidence would not change the personal nature of his uncles’ threats against both him and
his cousin. And it concluded that the IJ did not clearly err in finding that “the threats
against the applicant existed before he began working for the mayor, which [it said]
undermines his argument that his uncles targeted him due to his political opinion.” (App.
at 5-6.) It similarly affirmed the IJ’s CAT holding. Marroquin has timely petitioned for
review.
II.

DISCUSSION 4
Marroquin argues that the IJ and BIA erred in denying both his withholding of

removal and his CAT claims. The government responds, and we agree, that the IJ and

We have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a),
and Marroquin’s reinstated order of removal is the equivalent of a final order. See
Debeato v. Att’y Gen., 505 F.3d 231, 235 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[Section] 1252(a)(2)(D) …
permits us to exercise jurisdiction over … final orders that the Attorney General has
reinstated pursuant to § 1231(a)(5).”). Constitutional claims and questions of law are
reviewed de novo. Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 502 (3d Cir. 2011). Factual
findings of the agency are reviewed for substantial evidence. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v.
Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 2011). That means findings of fact must be
“supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as
a whole.” Garcia, 665 F.3d at 502 (internal citations omitted). “We may only consider
the reasons provided by the [BIA], but where the [BIA] both adopts the findings of the
[IJ] and discusses some of the bases for the [IJ’s] decision, we have authority to review
4
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BIA appropriately concluded that there is no nexus between Marroquin’s withholding of
removal claim and his alleged PSG or political opinion. We also agree with the IJ’s and
BIA’s holding that the CAT claim fails because Marroquin has not established that the
authorities would acquiesce in any alleged torture he says he will suffer if he is removed
to Guatemala.
A.

The IJ and BIA Properly Denied Withholding of Removal.

Marroquin’s withholding of removal claim lacks nexus to a PSG because his
evidence shows that his uncles were not motivated by his being a descendant of his
grandfather. Nor has he shown that they threatened him based on their differences in
political affiliation. Instead, the evidence shows that, if anything, his uncles were
motivated by economic jealousy over his potential property rights and his government
patronage positions. They were aware of his economic and professional situation
because they were part of the same family unit, but kinship ties must be more than the
basis of knowledge about a victim; they must be a central reason for the persecution. 5

the decisions of both the [IJ] and the [BIA].” Saravia v. Att’y Gen., 905 F.3d 729, 734
(3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In his briefing, Marroquin additionally argues that remand is required for the IJ
to more fully consider his asserted PSG and because the BIA erred in not considering
whether Marroquin had experienced past persecution. The government acknowledges in
supplemental briefing that it has waived any defense to a challenge by Marroquin of the
agency’s finding on the cognizability of his asserted PSG. Instead, it asks that we assume
cognizability and rule on lack of nexus, which we do herein. Marroquin also argues he
should have been given the opportunity to corroborate his claim that his uncles murdered
his cousin. The BIA rejected that argument because such corroboration would not
change the IJ’s nexus holding, and we agree.
5
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A noncitizen pursuing withholding of removal “bears the burden of proving that
he will more likely than not face persecution on account of … [a] protected ground[].”
Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att’y Gen., 781 F.3d 677, 684 (3d Cir. 2015). This means that the
protected ground was “a central reason for [the alleged] persecution[.]” Matter of A-B-,
27 I.&N. Dec. 316, 330 (A.G. 2018). Those protected grounds include “race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, [and] political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(A). “Conflicts of a personal nature and isolated criminal acts do not
constitute persecution on account of a protected characteristic.” Gonzalez-Posadas, 781
F.3d at 685; see also Romero v. Att’y Gen., 972 F.3d 334, 342 (3d Cir. 2020)
(“[P]etitioner’s fear of personal conflict … does not suffice to entitle him to relief[.]”).
The motivations of a persecutor are a question of fact, while the ultimate determination of
whether those motivations have a nexus to a protected ground is a question of law. See
Matter of N-M-, 25 I.&N. Dec. 526, 532 (BIA 2011) (“A persecutor’s actual motive is a
matter of fact to be determined by the [IJ] and reviewed by us for clear error.”); see also
Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 727 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[W]e have a very deferential
standard of review of the BIA’s findings of fact and may only reverse these findings if
the evidence compels us to do so[.]”).
Marroquin claims that he was persecuted because he is part of a PSG defined as
descendants of his grandfather. The evidence does not support that. He testified that his
uncles (who are also part of that same alleged PSG) wanted land that he stood to inherit
from his father, and so they targeted him as well as certain other family members who
also stood to inherit a share of that property, such as his cousin. But his evidence shows
8

that his uncles did not target all members of the family, only those in line to inherit land,
and only individuals in Marroquin’s generation. Assuming the truth of his story, his
uncles’ motivation was quite clearly economic. In other words, they did not threaten
Marroquin because he is in his grandfather’s bloodline; they threatened him because he is
supposedly going to inherit property. Marroquin even noted that they did not target his
father, despite his father’s more immediate claim to the land. Marroquin’s father’s
declaration is consistent on this point, as is testimony from Marroquin during his removal
hearing and in his I-589 application. (See, e.g., AR at 232 (declaration by Marroquin’s
father that “Raul and Pedro Cordova, for example, were family members who were upset
that I owned … land and they took out their anger on my son, William”); AR at 134
(testimony of Marroquin that the “dispute and problems [started] because … my uncles,
they want to inherit the entire land [and] don’t want to give anyone any share of it”); AR
at 374 (reporting in the I-589 application that he “fear[s] that if [he] return[s] to
Guatemala, [his] uncles will threaten to and seek to kill [him]” because they “want the
land that [he] will inherit from [his] father”).)
Marroquin also argued that his persecution was on account of his political opinion
because he supported a mayor of a different party than the party for whom his uncles
worked. That alleged nexus is, again, not supported by the evidence, which demonstrated
only that Marroquin’s uncles lost their patronage positions with the government at about
the same time Marroquin gained his, and they were therefore jealous of his good fortune.
Although Marroquin’s uncles supported a different political party, he did not testify or
present any evidence that their alleged persecution was driven by political disagreement.
9

(See AR at 129-30 (testifying that his uncles were “jealous of [his] position[s],” which
were “good jobs[,]” “[b]ecause they previously worked for the municipality and they
were then at that time unemployed and so because of jealousy, they wanted to try to harm
[him]”); AR at 130 (“They threatened me because they stated that they felt jealous -jealousy that I had that position because previously they had worked as body guards for
the previous mayor.”).) The IJ rejected Marroquin’s claims of nexus to political opinion
for that reason. (See App. at 13 (“Even though Raul and Pedro … were purported
members of ‘The Leader’ party and had what appeared to be patronage positions as
bodyguards to the prior mayor, there is no evidence that … Marroquin’s … political
activities … were the basis for any harm, threats or other adverse activities[.]”). We
therefore agree with the IJ and the BIA that Marroquin’s withholding of removal claim
lacks merit due to lack of nexus to a protected ground.
B.

The IJ and BIA Properly Denied Relief under the Convention Against
Torture.

Eligibility for protection under the CAT requires an applicant to show “it is more
likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of
removal.” Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 303, 310-11 (3d Cir. 2011)
(citation omitted); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). The applicant must also show that the
government will acquiesce to such torture, meaning he “must demonstrate that, prior to
the activity constituting torture, a public official was aware of it and thereafter breached
his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent it.” Orellana v. Att’y Gen., 956 F.3d
171, 181 (3d Cir. 2020). “The applicant can meet this standard even where the
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government does not have actual knowledge of the torturous activity if he produc[es]
sufficient evidence that the government [ ] is willfully blind to such activities.” Myrie v.
Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 516 (3d Cir. 2017) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Findings concerning how government officials will respond to any mistreatment are
factual, while the question of whether that response constitutes acquiescence is a legal
one. Id. at 516-17.
Marroquin argues that the BIA’s decision provides too little explanation to
adequately address his arguments. See Myrie, 855 F.3d at 517 (“In order for us to be able
to give meaningful review to the BIA’s decision, we must have some insight into its
reasoning.” (quoting Awolesi v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 227, 232 (3d Cir. 2003)). He also
argues that the BIA’s findings under the CAT are not supported by substantial evidence,
because it “overlooked evidence explaining why [he] never sought help from the police.”
(Opening Br. at 35.) He says that the BIA should have looked to his testimony “that his
uncles have a lot of influence over the police, and that the police would be afraid to act in
defiance of them.” (Opening Br. at 35 (citing AR at 141).) As support for his argument,
he notes that he informed the office of the Mayor that he would not return to work
because his uncles were trying to hurt him, and he says he submitted country conditions
articles and a Department of State report on police corruption and inefficacy.
Contrary to Marroquin’s complaint, however, the IJ and BIA adequately explained
their holdings. The IJ held that “the facts and evidence [do not] indicate that … the
threats constituted torture” and that Marroquin “has failed to illustrate that any harm that
he would face would be at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
11

public official.” (App. at 16.) The IJ further explained that Marroquin never sought help
from the police, nor did he seek help from the political leaders for whom he worked. He
reasoned that Marroquin’s bare testimony that the authorities could not or would not help
was not enough to demonstrate acquiescence. The BIA affirmed that conclusion, noted
the IJ’s reasoning, and cited to the relevant portion of the IJ’s decision. That is sufficient
for our review, Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004), and sufficient to
support the denial of CAT relief.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Marroquin’s petition for review.
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